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The period when corporate social responsibil-
ity (“CSR”) only referred to corporate philan-
thropic donations has passed. Contemporary 
CSR is intimately intertwined with sustainable 
development, and its growth in the last several 
decades has been evident in Canada. The recent 
appearance of “hybrid” corporate legal structures 
on the international stage marks a growing trend 
toward enabling the dual pursuit of economic 
and social mandates for businesses. This suggests 
that the next significant stage in the CSR move-
ment will be in the reformation and creation of 
corporate legal models that not only enable, but 
require, CSR concepts to be embodied within 
corporate governance practices. 
This article borrows the term “transforma-
tional” from the business sector to help identify a 
tangible goal for corporate governance reform in 
Canada. Highlights include having a sustain-
able purpose, long term vision, and multi-stake-
holder collaboration. While the US shareholder 
primacy model is often presumed to be the model 
that is dominant in modern Canadian corpo-
rations, this presumption is flawed. This article 
identifies some of the fundamental legal features 
that set Canada apart from US shareholder 
primacy, and attempts to demarcate a path for 
Canada to attain transformational corporate 
governance through its laws. Canada is poised to 
become a leader in corporate governance reform 
on two fronts: (1) the reformation of its exist-
ing laws regulating mainstream corporate gov-
ernance practices, and (2) the creation of hybrid 
laws that can meet growing demands to legally 
house and govern social enterprises. 
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There has been much fanfare surrounding 
the possible implementation of a hybrid model 
similar to the US benefit corporation in Canada 
in order to address the for-profit sector’s growing 
needs to pursue social value in addition to 
profit-making. However, some of the fundamen-
tal legal characteristics within the benefit corpo-
ration actually parallel existing common laws in 
Canada regarding mainstream corporate gover-
nance practices. Canada does not need to adopt 
American solutions to American problems. 
During these formative years of Canada’s cor-
porate legal development, the nation’s progressive 
legal stance must be properly understood and 
taken into account when establishing hybrid 
laws so as not to confuse and/or jeopardize that 
stance. An ongoing stream of thoughtful and 
intelligent commentary is needed to address and 
advance Canadian corporate legal needs for 
social progress, as well as the establishment of 
innovative new hybrid laws that can bridge the 
gap between for-profit and non-profit sectors.
L’époque où la responsabilité sociétale des entre-
prises (“RSE”) se manifestait uniquement au 
travers de dons philanthropiques des entreprises 
est révolue. La RSE moderne est maintenant 
intimement liée au développement durable, et 
sa croissance au Canada au cours des dernières 
décennies est évidente. L’apparition récente de 
structures juridiques ‘hybrides’ des entreprises 
sur la scène internationale vient marquer le 
développement d’une tendance visant à per-
mettre pour les entreprises la double poursuite 
de mandats à la fois économiques et sociaux. 
Désormais, le chemin à emprunter semble clair. 
L’évolution de ce mouvement se fera dans le 
domaine de la réforme et la création de nou-
veaux modèles juridiques pour les entreprises qui 
non seulement permettront, mais surtout nécess-
iteront, l’adoption et l’incorporation des concepts 
de RSE dans leurs pratiques de gouvernance.
Cet article emprunte le terme ‘transforma-
tionnel’ du domaine des affaires afin d’aider à 
identifier l’objectif à atteindre pour réformer 
la gouvernance d’entreprise. Les faits saillants 
sont multiples : l’adoption d’une raison d’être 
durable, une vision à long terme, et une col-
laboration active de toutes les parties prenantes. 
Même si le modèle américain de la primauté des 
actionnaires est souvent présumé être le modèle 
dominant au sein des entreprises Canadiennes, 
cette présomption est en fait erronée. Cet article 
identifie les caractéristiques juridiques fonda-
mentales qui séparent le Canada et ce modèle 
américain, et tente de délimiter un chemin 
pour que le Canada puisse atteindre, à travers 
ses propres lois, une gouvernance des entreprises 
‘transformationnelle’. Le Canada est parfaite-
ment placé pour devenir le chef de fil des réformes 
de la gouvernance des entreprises sur deux fronts: 
d’une part grâce à la reforme de ses lois actuelles 
qui règlementent les pratiques de gouvernance 
des entreprises, et d’une autre avec la création de 
lois hybrides qui pourront héberger et gouverner 
les entreprises à vocation sociale. 
La possibilité récente d’une mise en oeuvre 
d’un modèle hybride qui ressemblerait à la 
‘benefit corporation’ américaine au Canada, 
afin d’adresser le besoin croissant du secteur à but 
lucratif de poursuivre une valeur sociale ajoutée, 
a provoqué beaucoup d’excitation. Cependant, 
certaines caractéristiques juridiques présen-
tes aux sein de la ‘benefit corporation’ rappelle 
déjà les lois qui réglementent la gouvernance 
des entreprises au Canada. Le Canada n’a donc 
pas besoin d’adopter des solutions américaines 
inventées pour répondre à des problèmes améri-
cains. A présent, lorsque nous nous apprêtons à 
développer ces nouvelles lois des affaires, il est 
important de saisir la position juridique progres-
sive de ce pays et de la prendre en compte quand 
nous tentons d’établir nos propres lois hybrides. 
Sinon, nous risquons de la compromettre. Pour 
que les structures juridiques des entreprises puis-
sent répondre aux demandes du progrès social, 
ainsi que pour établir des lois hybrides novatri-
ces capables de combler le fossé entre le secteur à 
but lucratif et le secteur à but non lucratif, une 
analyse intelligente et réfléchie est requise.
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To qualify as “transformational,” a company must both transform its own business 
model toward sustainability and the larger economic ecosystem in which it exists.
Coro Strandberg1
There is a general understanding among corporate legal scholars that the concept of shareholder primacy is deeply ingrained within the modern corporation—pursuing anything other than shareholder wealth is tantamount to bad governance.2 Social 
gains resulting from corporate actions are considered ancillary, subordinate, and/or support-
ing of the singular objective of profit making.3 However, within the last decade, innovative 
new alternative legal structures have appeared on the international stage. These “hybrid” cor-
porate structures blend for-profit and non-profit legal characteristics into their governance 
models, enabling businesses with infrastructure to pursue both economic and social man-
dates. Some alternative models available to social entrepreneurs include the low profit limited 
liability company and the benefit corporation in the United States and the community inter-
est company in the United Kingdom. Restrictions on dividends, obligations on directors to 
consider community interests, and community-purpose asset locks are some examples of the 
unique governing features found within these models. 
1 Coro Strandberg, “Transformational companies tackle the double whammy” (25 September 2012), 
online: Coro Strandberg – Sustainability Consultant <http://corostrandberg.com/blog/sustainability/
transformational-companies>.
2 Adolf A Berle Jr & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: MacMillan, 
1932).
3 Michael Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function” (2001) 
14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8.
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Canada is beginning to contemplate the adoption of hybrid corporate models into its laws, 
and the process has already begun in a few provinces. The growth of the “social enterprise”—a 
term with no legal import that commonly refers to either a for-profit trying to do social good 
or an enterprising non-profit—is beginning to generate a legislative response. In March 2012, 
the British Columbia government announced the creation of a new hybrid model, the com-
munity contribution company.4 Nova Scotia has since followed suit, announcing the adoption 
of a similar hybrid in November 2012.5 These provincial hybrids are each modeled after the 
British community interest company, which is designed to allow traditional non-profits the 
ability to make a profit and raise capital while keeping the social mission intact through strin-
gent limitations on their distribution of capital.6
There is now much fanfare surrounding the possible implementation of a hybrid similar 
to the US benefit corporation to address traditional for-profit sector needs for social progress.7 
However, some of the fundamental legal characteristics within the benefit corporation that dif-
ferentiate that model from traditional US corporate laws seem to parallel the existing common 
law in Canada. As Canada begins to move toward the active implementation of hybrids, a 
pressing and important question arises: What is Canada’s actual legal model to govern its cor-
porations? The answer to that question dictates how Canada should proceed in the adoption 
of hybrid corporate legal structures. If the benefit corporation is designed mainly to address 
American corporate governance needs for social progress, then, before Canada elects to adopt 
similar laws, there must first be an accurate depiction and understanding of Canada’s own 
governance position. This will ensure that Canada does not simply adopt an American solution 
to an American problem that is not reflective of Canada’s current progressive legal stance and 
potentially confuse or jeopardize that stance.
Corporate governance itself is a complicated matter, deriving from various laws, customs, 
and processes—with significant normative underpinnings—and these continue to be forma-
tive years in development of Canada’s governance standards. Landmark judgments by the 
Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) have indicated that corporate directors are not confined 
to decision-making focused solely on shareholders’ interests, short-term profit, or share value. 
The SCC recognized that community and environmental interests, among other stakeholder 
interests, may also be taken into account. The court has found that directors are required “to 
4 British Columbia Ministry of Finance, “BC introduces act allowing social enterprise companies” (5 March 
2012), online: Government of British Columbia <http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-
2013/2012FIN0011-000240.htm>. 
5 Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations, “New Opportunities for Social Entrepreneurs” (28 November 
2012), online: Province of Nova Scotia <http://novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20121128010>.
6 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (UK), c 27 [UK Companies Act]; 
The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005 (UK), SI 2005/1788 [CIC Regulations].
7 See e.g. Stacey Corriveau et al, “Benefit Corporations in Canada: A tool to support blended enter-
prise in Canada” (2011) MaRS Centre for Impact Investing [draft with author] [MaRS White Paper]; 
BC Social Innovation Council, “Action Plan Recommendations to Maximize Social Innovations in 
British Columbia” (March 2012), online: Government of British Columbia <http://innovationbc2011.
crowdvine.com/attachments/0002/7179/Social_InnovationBC_C.pdf> at 11; Adam Spence, “In search 
of the benefit corporation” (25 November 2010), online: MaRS Centre for Impact Investing <http://
www.marsdd.com/2010/11/25/in-search-of-the-benefit-corporation/>; “Beneficial Corporations” 
(October 2012), online: Sustainable Prosperity <http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/dl894&display>.
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  act in the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen”8 and “commen-
surate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.”9 These findings by the 
SCC suggest that Canada is shifting away from the US shareholder primacy model. However, 
conflicts in corporate law have meant that Canadian directors face a variety of legal interpreta-
tions with respect to evolving director duties and liabilities. In addition to tensions in the law, 
the growth of social enterprises in the business sector, the frequent appearance of CSR in codes 
of conduct, and a wealth of asymmetrical information from American neighbours have left 
Canadian directors with minimal concrete guidance on how to balance competing interests 
in their corporate decision-making. Significant questions arise as to the value of sustainable 
performance when it is pitted directly against increasing shareholder value. 
This article will attempt to demarcate a path for Canada to attain transformational corpo-
rate governance for its corporations. The term “transformational” is borrowed from the busi-
ness sector to help identify a tangible goal for corporate governance reform in Canada. The 
non-profit organization Canadian Business for Social Responsibility (“CBSR”) partnered with 
Coro Strandberg to describe 19 qualities of transformational companies, in particular describ-
ing what these companies do, how they do it, and with whom they interact.10 Highlights from 
this list include having a sustainable purpose, long-term vision, and multi-stakeholder col-
laboration. Methods for achieving this form of transformational governance are multifaceted 
and may be dependent on the particular industry in which a corporation is involved. While 
CSR has become a dominant force in recent decades within academic scholarship, the role of 
corporate law in eliciting CSR practices has been a limited one, particularly in a Canadian 
context. This article focuses on the corporate legal elements that form the skeleton for transfor-
mational corporate governance to take hold and the particular forces that are trending Canada 
away from old methods of governance. The emergence of international corporate structures 
that have embedded non-profit legal characteristics into their governance models suggests that 
a new breed of reform has entered the CSR movement. These hybrid models have only been 
examined by a handful of scholars to date,11 and none of these models have been examined 
from a Canadian standpoint.
Section One of this article begins by outlining the mainstream shareholder primacy model 
of corporate governance and the specific legal problem to be addressed: the role of stakeholder 
interests in corporate decision-making under that model. This problem is briefly situated within 
8 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 66, 3 SCR 560 [BCE].
9 Ibid at para 82.
10 “19 Qualities of Transformational Companies”, online: Canadian Business for Social Responsibility 
<http://www.cbsr.ca/qualities-of-transformational-companies> (What transformational companies do: 
(1) sustainable purpose; (2) sustainable customer offerings; (3) solutions-oriented; (4) restorative. How 
they do it: (5) long term vision; (6) sustainability governance and culture; (7) leadership; (8) employee 
engagement; (9) inclusive business; (10) closed-looped; (11) resource productivity; (12) value-chain 
influence; (13) stakeholder accountability and transparency. Who they interact with: (14) customer 
engagement; (15) industry standards; (16) multi-stakeholder collaboration; (17) finance community; 
(18) public engagement; and (19) public policy advocacy).
11 Of the few articles available, see e.g. Julie Battiliana et al, “In Search of the Hybrid Ideal” (2012) 10 
Stanford Social Innovation Review 51; Dana Brakman Reiser, “Governing and Financing Blended 
Enterprise” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent L Rev 619 [Brakman Reiser, “Governing”]; Dana Brakman Reiser, 
“Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma” (2010) 35 Vermont L Rev 105. 
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longstanding debates in corporate legal history and then brought into present day discussions 
by considering the important linkage between law, self-governance, and external pressures that 
may pre-empt and/or inform the law. Section Two identifies how Canada stands apart from 
the US shareholder primacy model and provides doctrinal as well as theoretical analysis of 
Canada’s path to transformational corporate governance reform through Canadian common 
law. Section Three considers the possibility that Canada may be primed to attain a mainstream 
model that integrates CSR practices into its governance framework. This section examines the 
ability of the for-profit corporation to achieve transformational change and points to corporate 
hybridity as a new wave of reform to which Canada should turn its focus. Three high-level 
action items are outlined to promote the development of hybrid corporate models in Canada. 
In particular, Canada should be wary of adopting US-stylized hybrids that do not account for 
Canada’s existing progressive corporate legal stance. Section Four offers concluding thoughts.
2. THE PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED
The shareholder primacy model of corporate governance can be understood as adhering 
to the following principles: (1) “ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the 
shareholder class;”12 (2) “the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obli-
gation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders;”13 (3) “noncontrolling 
shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling 
shareholders;”14 (4) “the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal 
measure of its shareholders’ interests;”15 and (5) other stakeholders, such as “employees, sup-
pliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment”16 should have their interests 
protected “by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate 
governance.”17 While all these principles are touched upon in this article, the last principle will 
receive the most discussion. The difference of having the protection of stakeholder interests 
addressed only through contractual or regulatory means rather than through internal self-
governance may seem slight. However, there is a worthwhile distinction between having the 
law as the only enforcement mechanism to police social and environmental harms and having 
the added layer of protection from corporate self-governance, which should translate to greater 
improvements in corporate sustainability practices. The frequent point of tension rests on the 
role of law to curtail social and environmental harms at the expense of commerce. For mean-
12 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 439 
at 440.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid at 441.
15 Ibid.
16 As defined in Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 at para 42, 3 SCR 461 
[Peoples] and affirmed in BCE, supra note 8 at para 39.
17 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 12 at 441. There is generally little contention in legal scholarship 
regarding the definition of shareholder primacy. See e.g. Jill E Fisch, “Measuring Efficiency in Corporate 
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy” (2006) 31 J Corp L 637 at 637 (shareholder primacy “defines the 
objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth”); Ian B Lee, “Efficiency and Ethics 
in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy” (2006) 31 Del J Corp L 533 at 535 (defining shareholder 
primacy as “the view that managers’ fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth 
and preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies”).
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ingful change to occur, sustainable business models will need to be integrated into corporate 
strategies for the long term.
In corporate legal history, the classic shareholder versus stakeholder debate has been an 
extended one. The fundamental question has been whether shareholder primacy should be 
invoked in all circumstances: “Does the firm exist only to increase shareholder wealth …? Or, 
should managers also seek to serve the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the 
broader society …?”18 The importance of proper governance and, in particular, the problematic 
separation of ownership and control within the corporate institution, was most notably identi-
fied in the 1932 book entitled The Modern Corporation and Private Property by the American 
authors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.19 Berle and Means described how public corpora-
tions were beginning to be comprised of two factions: controlling managers, considered the 
new “princes” of the social institution, and passive shareholders, the only residual claimants to 
the company’s net assets.20 In a later article, Berle outlined how management’s authority was 
to be exercised for the benefit of the corporation’s shareholders. According to Berle, “all powers 
granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the 
corporation . . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders 
as their interest appears.”21 
Following Berle’s article, an active exchange arose between Berle and E Merrick Dodd 
that is generally regarded as originating current debates between advocates of shareholder 
primacy and CSR. In response to Berle, Dodd argued for “a view of the business corporation 
as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function,” 
claiming to identify an emerging public consensus that corporations should operate as “good 
citizens.”22 Berle replied in a subsequent note that discarding a specific duty to shareholders, 
without substituting a reasonably clear alternative mandate, would impart too much discretion 
to management. In light of the separation between ownership and control, Berle believed the 
result would be vast, uncontrolled managerial power with no means to ensure its responsible 
exercise.23
A few decades later, Berle conceded that Dodd’s position had at least temporarily pre-
vailed, as he observed that actual corporate practice and common law decisions had, over 
time, adopted Dodd’s general viewpoint against a stricter fiduciary duty.24 As Archie Carroll 
and Kareem M Shabana describe, “the foundation for CSR was being developed by a quickly 
changing social environment and pressures from others, especially activists, to adopt CSR per-
18 Lynn A Stout, “Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy” (2002) 75 S Cal L Rev 1189 
at 1190.
19 Berle & Means, supra note 2.
20 Ibid at 116.
21 Adolf A Berle Jr, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1049 at 1049.
22 E Merrick Dodd Jr, “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1145 at 1148.
23 Adolf A Berle Jr, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1365 at 
1372.
24 Adolf A Berle Jr, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1954) at 
169.
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spectives, attitudes, practices and policies.”25 Nevertheless, historical events frequently created 
a push-and-pull over the dichotomy between the two sides. 
Since the Berle-Dodd exchange, the shareholder versus stakeholder debate in corporate 
law “has proven most fundamental and enduring.”26 American corporate legal scholarship has 
grappled with the issue of how to incorporate stakeholder interests in corporate governance for 
decades. Business models specifically addressing stakeholder interests in for-profit corporations 
became prominent in the mid-1980s.27 The motivation behind stakeholder management was 
to build a framework that would respond to the concerns of managers experiencing a business 
environment “buffeted by unprecedented levels of environmental turbulence and change.”28 
The term stakeholder referred to “any group or individual who is affected by or can affect 
the achievement of an organization’s objectives,” and thus included any person or entity that 
simply could assist in or benefit from a corporation’s success.29 Stakeholder theory encouraged 
management to develop business strategies that invest in all stakeholder relationships that will 
help to ensure its long-term success. The theory places critical importance on developing an 
understanding of the actual stakeholders specific to the institution in question as, through 
this level of understanding, management can create strategies supported by all stakeholders to 
ensure the long-term survival of the institution.
Stakeholder theory has received a general level of acceptance by corporate legal scholars on 
both sides of the classic Berle-Dodd debate. For those who argue that corporations should have 
the singular objective of shareholder wealth maximization, the theory supports this position by 
its claim that incorporating stakeholder interests simply furthers that cause.30 In the case where 
other stakeholder interests conflict with that of shareholders, shareholder interests prevail. 
For those claiming that managers should seek to serve the interests of other stakeholders—
including by ensuring sustainable practices within a corporation—stakeholder theory may also 
appease them, though with notable limitations. It is necessary, however, not to prematurely 
equate shareholder primacy to unfriendly social and environmental practices. Some scholars, 
for example, have supported increased shareholder democracy, pointing to examples where 
shareholders have advocated for sustainable reporting and other measures that have improved 
25 Archie B Carroll and Kareem M Shabana, “The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Review of Concepts, Research, and Practice” (2010) 12(1) International Journal of Management Reviews 
85 at 87.
26 Lynn A Stout, “New Thinking on ‘Shareholder Primacy’” (2012) 2 Journal of Accounting, Economics, 
and Law – A Convivium (AEL) 1 at 2.
27 R Edward Freeman & John McVea, “A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management” in Michael A 
Hitt, R Edward Freeman & Jeefrey S Harrison, eds, The Blackwell Handbook for Strategic Management 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006) 188 at 189 (describing how its origins may have come from 
the Stanford Research Institute, now SRI International, in the 1960s). While the notion of stakeholder 
interests may have roots in a number of academic fields, much of the theoretical development behind 
stakeholder theory has been credited to work from R Edward Freeman and others at The Wharton School 
of Business at the University of Pennsylvania (ibid).
28 Ibid at 188.
29 R Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) at 46.
30 See Jensen, supra note 3.
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corporate actions.31 Sustainable practices are not the antithesis of shareholder primacy; they 
simply generate from financial motivations that at times overlap with sustainability and at 
other times do not. The issue, then, is whether it is sufficient to have shareholders act as the 
centrepiece of corporate interests with sustainability as a potential by-product. 
This article examines the legal elements that are trending Canada towards a stakeholder-
supported model of governance—particularly the fortification of CSR32 within Canada’s 
modern corporations and the development of new hybrid legal structures. While the main 
focus of this article is on Canadian corporate law and governance and its potential contri-
butions to sustainable development, this analysis does not negate the existence of external 
motivations that may pre-empt and/or inform the law. Several notable studies have considered 
corporate behaviour and factors that contribute to altering that behaviour beyond the direct 
implementation of hard laws. These works are important in the study of corporate self-govern-
ance, but there are always challenges in addressing an issue that spans across several disciplines 
(business, finance, economics, law, political science, sociology, environmental studies, among 
several others), and is broached in several theories and approaches within those disciplines 
(such as institutionalism, organizational behaviour, law and economics, law and society, to 
name a very few). In sum, additional forces at play tend to operate with more subtlety than 
legal rules in influencing corporate behaviour.33 Regulation itself cannot adequately explain the 
differences in environmental performance across organizations. Empirical research has shown 
how “social license” pressures—particularly from local communities and environmental activ-
ists—have been found to compel some organizations to move toward higher compliance stan-
dards than others.34 But at the same time, economic counter-pressures tend to impose limits on 
“beyond compliance” investments. 35 Robert Kagan, Neil Gunningham, and Dorothy Thorton 
note that:
Regulation still matters greatly, but less as a system of hierarchically imposed, uni-
formly enforced rules than as a coordinative mechanism, routinely interacting with 
31 See e.g. Janis Sarra,“Shareholders as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada Business 
Corporations Act” (2003) 39 Can Bus LJ 52. 
32 The prospect of defining CSR is not an easy one, and this article refrains from delving into that debate. 
Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon explain the difficulty in that “[f ]irst…CSR is an ‘essentially contested 
concept,’ being ‘appraisive’ (or considered as valued), ‘internally complex,’ and having relatively open 
rules of application. Second, CSR is an umbrella term overlapping with some, and being synonymous 
with other, conceptions of business-society relations. Third, it has clearly been a dynamic phenome-
non” (Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, “‘Implicit’ and ‘Explicit’ CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a 
Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility” (2007) 33:2 Academy of Management 
Review 404 at 405). Ultimately, “[t]heories of corporate social responsibility cast a potentially broader 
net, emphasizing all of the social costs of corporate activity, and therefore embrace, for example, environ-
mental or political concerns as well as stakeholder interests” (David Millon, “New Game Plan or Business 
as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law” (2000) 86 Va L Rev 1001 at 
1002). 
33 See e.g. Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, “Social License and Environmental 
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance” (2004) 29 Law & Soc Inquiry 307 (corporations 
at times require a “social license” to perform above regulatory compliance standards).
34 See Robert A Kagan, Neil Gunningham & Dorothy Thornton, “Explaining Corporate Environmental 
Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?” (2003) 37 Law & Soc’y Rev 51.
35 Ibid at 84.
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market pressures, local and national environmental activists, and the culture of corporate 
management in generating environmental improvement while narrowing the spread 
between corporate leaders and laggards.36 
Thus, while this article explores how Canada’s corporate governance laws and norms have 
shifted away from those of its southern neighbour, maintaining a sensible understanding of the 
limits and opportunities that hard and soft laws can play in influencing corporate behaviour 
is important. Scholars have pointed out that in the past several years, “an array of stakehold-
ers have turned to firms, rather than governments, to address enduring environmental prob-
lems including forest degradation, fisheries depletion, mining destruction, and even climate 
change.”37 An underlying awareness must be maintained as to how corporate law is part of a 
larger coordinative mechanism that continuously interacts with other dynamic pressures on 
the road to transformational corporate governance reform. 
That being said, regulatory requirements have undeniably brought about significant 
improvements in shaping corporate behaviour.38 Put in a legal context, “rules or standards of 
corporate stewardship evolve in the context of the larger public policy and regulatory frame-
work of corporate law, securities law, and a highly developed scheme of credit enforcement and 
bankruptcy law, which provide the normative ‘muscle’ to encourage particular kinds of govern-
ance behaviour.”39 Sensitivity to external pressures is important, but understanding the finer 
aspects of the law dealing with stakeholder interests, director accountability, and the broader 
corporate legal framework guiding a nation’s corporations is fundamental and imperative for 
achieving greater sustainable development. Laws may be part of a larger, dynamic social phe-
nomenon at play, but the power of ill-placed laws to limit opportunities and hinder growth is 
indisputable. Is it unnecessary for laws to acknowledge non-shareholder stakeholder interests 
in a board’s corporate decision-making? What parameters should be used to determine the 
best interests of the corporation? The answers to these questions matter very much, not just 
in a legal context but in a social one as well, as corporations continue to wield their enormous 
power over the sustainable management of our environmental resources.
3. MARKING A PATH FOR CANADA
Despite the significant role that Canadian corporations play in national issues, corporate legal 
scholarship does not seem to be an expanding field of study in Canada. Edward Waitzer noted 
this, commenting on Canada’s proximity to the United States and its relatively small gov-
36 Ibid [emphasis added].
37 Graeme Auld, Steven Bernstein, & Benjamin Cashore, “The New Corporate Social Responsibility” 
(2008) 33 Annual Review Environment and Resources 413 at 414.
38 See e.g. Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 34 at 51 (the authors explore variations in regula-
tory compliance in select industries to better understand how and to what extent regulation matters in 
shaping corporate behavior. They found that “regulatory requirements and intensifying political pressures 
brought about large improvements and considerable convergence” in the facilities they studied which also 
resulted in several facilities going “beyond compliance” measures in their corporate actions).
39 Janis Sarra, “Oversight, Hindsight, and Foresight: Canadian Corporate Governance through the Lens of 
Global Capital Markets” in Janis Sarra, ed, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2003) at 42.
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ernance community.40 Analysis of Canadian corporate governance is often quietly lumped 
together with American legal scholarship, under the assumption that the fundamentals of 
Canadian governance simply mirror those in the United States. While there is some merit to 
this stance—Canada does have features that in many ways reflect and respond to those in the 
United States—just as there are cultural similarities between the two nations, there are also 
stark differences.41 For example, when remarking on Canada’s relatively strong financial posi-
tion following the global financial crisis in a speech to the Institute of Corporate Directors, 
Purdy Crawford stated:
How were we able to do this? ... Ultimately all this has been possible because of our 
culture. We are so very different from our great neighbour to the south where the 
rule seems to be if something is not prohibited, you can do it. For better or for worse, 
we are more accepting of regulation.42 
Crawford went on to add that while the United States “is the greatest wealth-generating 
society in the world … this great characteristic has also resulted in great excesses.”43 
The following is a brief analysis of significant findings in two well-known cases that have 
set the potential course for Canadian corporate governance norms to transform into norms 
that embody stakeholder accountability and broader notions of CSR and sustainability. The 
analysis on the SCC’s findings in these cases will focus on the role of stakeholder interests in 
directorial decision-making when determining the “best interests of the corporation,” and the 
careful balance in maintaining appropriate levels of director accountability. While the cases are 
doctrinal by nature, this article will address the theoretical constructs and tensions underlying 
those decisions and how these constructs and tensions may inform the future trajectory of 
transformational Canadian corporate governance reform. 
3.1 Following PeoPles DePartment stores Inc (trustee of) v. WIse (2004)
Prior to 2004, a series of cases in Canada, particularly from Ontario, spoke to the existence of 
a fiduciary duty for directors to take reasonable steps to maximize shareholder value.44 These 
cases generally fell in line with the seminal US Delaware Supreme Court case of Revlon Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,45 where the court held that directors were found to owe a fidu-
40 Edward Waitzer, “Corporate Governance Reform – Discussion Paper” (26 October 2012) [draft with 
author].
41 Ronald B Davis, “Fox in S-OX North, A Question of Fit: The Adoption of United States Market 
Solutions in Canada” (2004) 33 Stetson L Rev 955 at 981.
42 Purdy Crawford, “Canada – The Great Recession and the Evolution of Corporate Governance” (Speech 
delivered at the Institute of Corporate Directors, 9 June 2011) [draft with author].
43 Ibid.
44 See e.g. Casurina Limited Partnership v Rio Algom Ltd, [2004] 40 BLR (3d) 112 at para 27, 181 OAC 19 
(Ont CA); Pacifica Papers Inc v Johnstone, [2001] 15 BLR (3d) 249 at para 30 (BCSC) affirmed in Pacifica 
Papers Inc v Johnstone, [2001] 93 BCLR (3d) 20, 19 BLR (3d) 63 (BCCA); Gazit (1997) Inc v Centrefund 
Realty Corp, [2000] 8 BLR (3d) 81 at para 69, [2000] OJ No 3070 (Ont SCJ); CW Shareholdings Inc v 
WIC Western International Communications Ltd, [1998] 160 DLR (4th) 131, 39 OR (3d) 755 (Gen Div); 
Benson v Third Canadian General Investment Trust Ltd, [1993] 13 BLR (2d) 265, 14 OR (3d) 493 at 500 
(Gen Div); 347883 Alberta Ltd v Producers Pipelines Inc, [1991] 3 BLR (2d) 237, 80 DLR (4th) 359 at 
399-402 (Sask CA). 
45 506 A (2d) 173 (Del Sup Ct 1986) [Revlon].
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ciary duty to maximizing shareholder value in takeover contexts, regardless of non-shareholder 
interests. Along with the prior US Delaware case of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum46 and the 1919 
case of Dodge v. Ford,47 Revlon is often cited (whether accurately or not)48 as a case that exem-
plifies the existence of shareholder primacy in corporate America. Shareholder wealth maxi-
mization is frequently cited as a fundamental feature in American corporate governance (not 
excluding of course, criticisms against this norm that still continue to acknowledge its strong 
presence).49 Canadian corporate legal scholars have also assumed the prevalence of shareholder 
primacy in modern day corporations, while often disregarding issues of differentiation between 
Canada and the United States.50
The Peoples decision51 stimulated several responses from legal professionals and scholars 
on its significance to the future of Canadian governance.52 In brief, following the bankruptcy 
of the Peoples Department Stores Inc., the trustee brought an action against the company’s 
directors for breaching their fiduciary duties by, prior to the bankruptcy, implementing a credit 
scheme that favoured Peoples’ parent company, Wise Stores Inc., over its creditors. Regarding 
the “best interests of the corporation,” the SCC stated:
[I]t is clear that the phrase the “best interests of the corporation” should be read not 
simply as the “best interests of the shareholders.” … [I]n determining whether they 
are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, 
given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, 
inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, 
governments and the environment.53
The court cited with approval the 1972 case of Teck Corp. v. Millar, in which it was held 
that if directors “observe a decent respect for other interests lying beyond those of the com-
pany’s shareholders in the strict sense, that will not… leave directors open to the charge that 
they have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.”54 Peoples marks the first instance where 
the court specifically validated the business judgment rule, meaning the courts will defer to the 
46 493 A (2d) 946 (Del Sup Ct 1985) [Unocal].
47 170 NW 668 (Mich Sup Ct 1919).
48 See e.g. Lynn A Stout, “Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford” (2008) 3:1 Virginia Law & 
Business Review at 163. 
49 See e.g. Fisch, supra note 17 at 637 (asserting that shareholder primacy “defines the objective of the 
corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth”); Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: 
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97 Nw U L Rev 547 at 573 (describing two 
principles of shareholder primacy: the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the principle of 
ultimate shareholder control); Berle & Means, supra note 2.
50 See e.g. Janis Sarra, ed, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).
51 Peoples, supra note 16.
52 Readers are encouraged to review the several summaries and analyses that are available. See e.g. Catherine 
Francis, “Peoples Department Store Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary 
Duties and Duty of Care” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 175; Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 232; Darcy 
L MacPherson, “Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty – A Comment on Peoples Department 
Stores v. Wise” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 383.
53 Peoples, supra note 16 at para 42.
54 [1972] 33 DLR (3d) 288 at para 97, 2 W.W.R. 385 (BCSC). 
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directors’ business judgment so long as those directors used an appropriate degree of prudence 
and diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the particular time the decision was 
made.55
The theoretical and practical implications of the SCC’s findings were mixed. Catherine 
Francis noted that the court’s findings were “significant and far-reaching,” and as a result 
“directors and officers must be scrupulous in their decision-making process and, if they ignore 
the interests of significant stakeholders, they do so at their peril.”56 Ian Lee found the SCC 
decision “striking” in its clear rejection of shareholder primacy.57 On the other hand, others in 
the business sector felt that the decision changed little in terms of the usual form of redress for 
creditors, known as the oppression remedy. While acknowledging that the decision broadened 
directors’ duties, the business judgment rule easily counterbalanced this effect.58
In response to Peoples, Stephanie Ben-Ishai suggested that the Canadian corporate gov-
ernance debate is operating on the false underlying assumption that the shareholder primacy 
model accurately describes Canadian corporate law’s treatment of public corporations.59 She 
noted that “[w]idespread current thinking among the Canadian legal community supports the 
view that Peoples is an unjustified departure from Canadian corporate law’s principal-agent, 
shareholder primacy understanding of the board of directors’ role in public corporations.”60 
She makes the case that the Canadian legal understanding of public corporations in actuality 
reflects a director primacy norm rather than a shareholder primacy norm. She then applied 
“team production theory,” a concept developed in 1999 by American corporate legal scholars 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to Canadian corporate law.61 
Blair and Stout took issue with the shareholder primacy model’s misleading view of 
ownership. They adopted their ideas of vesting allocational authority in an independent third 
party from Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz’s work on economic organization62 as well 
as Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales’ work on team production.63 Their theory offers a 
mediating hierarchy approach to corporate governance. Here, the perception is that “directors 
should be viewed as disinterested trustees charged with faithfully representing the interests not 
just of shareholders, but of all team members.”64 The public corporation is best viewed as a 
55 Peoples, supra note 16 at paras 64-65.
56 Francis, supra note 52 at 183.
57 Ian B Lee, “Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the ‘Best Interests of the Corporation’” (2005) 41 Can 
Bus LJ 212 at 213 [Lee, “Best Interests”].
58 “Peoples v. Wise: Much Ado About Nothing?” (Spring 2005), online: McMillan LLP <http://www.
mcmillan.ca/Peoples-v-Wise-Much-Ado-About-Nothing>.
59 Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law” (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 
299 at 305-14.
60 Ibid at 301. 
61 Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85:2 Va L Rev 
247. 
62 Armen A Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” 
(1972) 62 The American Economic Review 777.
63 Raghuram A Rajan & Luigi Zingales, “Power in a Theory of a Firm” (1998) 113 The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 387.
64 Blair & Stout, supra note 61 at 286.
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team of “shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as 
creditors.”65 Team members are required to forego significant rights to the legal entity created 
by incorporation, including property rights over the team’s mutual output and team inputs 
such as financial and human capital. In other words, corporate assets belong not to sharehold-
ers but to the corporation.66 In this sense, directors of public corporations do not maximize 
shareholder value but instead resolve competing claims that various stakeholders may have to 
the collective residual product of the corporation’s activities.67 
As Blair and Stout argue, the primary job of the board of directors of a public corporation 
is not to act as agents who “ruthlessly pursue shareholders’ interests at the expense of employ-
ees, creditors, or other team members.”68 Rather, the directors are trustees for the corpora-
tion itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests 
in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough for the productive coalition stays together.69 
The corporate team gives up control rights to a third party board that makes no firm-specific 
investment itself and is composed of outsiders to the actual productive activity.70 The board is, 
however, given control over the team’s assets, as well as the right to allocate output among team 
members, fire individual members or even break up the team. In return, the board is rewarded 
with a nominal share of the team’s output. As a result, the outsider directors have an incentive 
to choose an efficient and productive team and team members feel they can now safely invest 
in the corporation.71 
While Canadian scholars have been somewhat silent in opining on the team production 
theory, American scholars have provided a variety of reactions. Kellye Testy has called the team 
production theory a “[s]uperior normative theory of what corporate governance should be once 
unyoked from slavish devotion to shareholder interests” which “holds promise.”72 By removing 
the insistence on shareholder primacy, Blair and Stout leave the allocation of resources to the 
board, with the result that the costs of obtaining team-specific investments are lowered and 
the potential to maximize social wealth. They see the corporation as a collective enterprise and 
recast the duties that management might owe to those stakeholders affected by it. 
65 Ibid at 253.
66 Ibid at 250-251.
67 Relying on Rajan and Zingales’ research, Blair and Stout give credence to the propositions that (1) 
team members will only want to be part of a team if by doing so they can share in the economic surplus 
generated by team production, and (2) team members intuitively understand that it will be difficult to 
convince others to invest firm-specific resources in team production if shirking and “rent-seeking” go 
uncontrolled (ibid at 274). Blair and Stout describe rent-seeking as “situations where individuals expend 
time, money, and other resources competing for a fixed amount of wealth, in effect squabbling with each 
other over the size of their individual pieces of a fixed group pie” (ibid at 249). Thus, team members 
realize that it is in their own self-interest to create a higher authority that can limit this behaviour among 
team members. The team forms because the members perceive that each will obtain more from the 
co-operative enterprise than from individual action (ibid at 264-271).
68 Ibid at 280.
69 Ibid at 280-81.
70 Ibid at 274.
71 Ibid. 
72 Kellye Y Testy, “Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements” (2002) 76 Tul L 
Rev 1227 at 1234.
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Criticisms of the theory have come from both American supporters and detractors of the 
shareholder primacy model. David Millon has pointed out that decision-making regarding 
the allocation of resources then becomes “a matter of power rather than principle.”73 Others 
comment that, by allowing directors to look beyond shareholder interests, “directors who are 
told to be loyal to many constituencies are too likely to prove loyal to none.”74 The stakeholder 
excuse then can be used by directors to usurp control for ulterior motives.75 Advocates of share-
holder primacy have argued that directors would have free reign to serve their own interests 
without being held accountable to anyone.76 Many have also asserted that shareholders require 
a privileged status, and the ability to challenge directors whenever they fail to maximize share-
holder gain.77 
In response to criticism of greater director control, some advocates of stakeholder interests 
downplay the risk that directors will inevitably run amok unless held to strict standards of 
accountability to shareholders. Lawrence Mitchell, for example, argues that, in general, it is 
appropriate to trust directors to act in good faith, taking all stakeholder interests into account.78 
Shareholders will still enjoy a positive return on their investment. Moreover, the obsession with 
holding managers strictly accountable to shareholders may actually be counterproductive. It 
treats managers as if they are “moral infants, incapable of living up to higher expectations” 
which ultimately encourages selfish, irresponsible behaviour on their part.79 Giving boards 
discretionary power, on the other hand, “allows them to develop as morally mature decision-
making bodies.”80 
While the team production theory is a useful alternative model upon which Canadian 
scholars may draw reference, the theory is limited in other notable ways. Blair and Stout’s list 
of relevant team members conspicuously excludes key stakeholder groups, such as the broader 
community and the environment. Directors and managers are no less obliged to consider 
eco-friendly corporate practices under team production theory than under the shareholder 
primacy model. Nevertheless, whereas shareholder primacy relies on its single corporate objec-
tive function, the team production model aligns more favourably with sustainable practices by 
73 Millon, supra note 32 at 1026.
74 David A Skeel Jr, “Icarus and American Corporate Regulation” (2005) 61 Bus Law 155 at 176. 
75 George W Dent Jr, “Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of 
Corporate Governance” online: (2007) 7:21 Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995186>.
76 Nell Minow, “Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors” (1991) 21 Stetson L Rev 197; James 
J Hanks Jr, “Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s” (1991) 21 Stetson 
L Rev 97.
77 See e.g. Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 
305.
78 Lawrence E Mitchell, “Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the 
Causes of Corporate Immorality” (1995) 73 Tex L Rev 477. 
79 Lawrence E Mitchell, “The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility” in Doreen McBarnet, 
Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
80 Ibid at 537.
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accounting for non-shareholder stakeholder interests and by recognizing corporate purposes 
beyond shareholder wealth maximization. 
Ben-Ishai suggests that, because the director primacy norm accurately describes Canadian 
corporate law, further consideration needs to be given to corporate law’s relative relevance 
in dictating how Canadian corporations currently operate. In particular, “[d]o directors of 
Canadian corporations really think of themselves as mediating hierarchs and corporations as 
teams? More importantly, can directors of Canadian corporations play a mediating hierarch 
role given the current composition of corporate boards?”81 She believes that the responses to 
these questions will help inform further inquiry into whether the director primacy norm is the 
ideal norm for Canadian corporate law.82 
In Peoples, the SCC made no mention of US case law and did not expressly distinguish 
the Revlon and Unocal cases. But such references should not be expected, or seen as a missing 
element to the SCC’s decision in Peoples—Canadian courts in general, and the SCC in par-
ticular, certainly do not have to account for US case law in their decision-making. The court 
was, however, vague in its formulation of its fiduciary duties, leaving “directors and courts little 
guidance as to the appropriate yardstick against which to measure the discharge by the direc-
tors of their duties in any particular fact situation.”83 Lee expressed his disappointment over 
the SCC’s failure to address the normative aspects of shareholder primacy head-on, finding it 
unfortunate given “there are good reasons for questioning shareholder primacy.”84
In the subsequent 2007 decision of Ventas Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment 
Trust,85 the Ontario Court of Appeal, while indicating that there is “no doubt” that the direc-
tors of a target corporation in a takeover context have fiduciary obligations “to take steps to 
maximize shareholder … value in the process,” made no mention of Peoples.86 Legal practition-
ers J. Alex Moore and William Ainley surmise that “the implicit conclusion in Ventas was that, 
whatever it meant to owe a duty exclusively to the corporation, it did not displace the fiduciary 
obligation of a board to maximize shareholder value when the corporation was being sold.”87 
3.2 folloWIng BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008)
The findings in Peoples regarding stakeholder interests created a springboard for future deci-
sions to build upon. In the highly anticipated 2008 decision in BCE,88 the SCC affirmed 
81 Ibid at 321.
82 Ibid.
83 J Alex Moore & William Ainley, “BCE v.1976 Debentureholders: An Unexamined Question Considered”, 
online: Davies <http://www.dwpv.com> at 5.
84 Lee, “Best Interests”, supra note 57 at 222.
85 2007 ONCA 205 at para 53, 85 OR (3d) 254, Blair JA [Ventas].
86 Ibid.
87 Moore & Ainley, supra note 83.
88 BCE, supra note 8.
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Peoples and appeared to further temper the shareholder primacy norm.89 In brief, debenture-
holders of Bell Canada, a subsidiary of BCE Inc., used the oppression remedy to seek relief 
concerning the privatization of BCE by a consortium of private equity buyers under a plan of 
arrangement that had been determined by BCE’s directors to be in the best interests of BCE 
and its shareholders. Upon the completion of the arrangement, the debentureholders stood to 
lose approximately 20 percent of the short-term trading value of their holdings.
Moore and Ainley noted that “in light of the questions raised following the Peoples deci-
sion, and the confusion the decision created at the Quebec Court of Appeal in BCE, the 
question of how Peoples could be reconciled with the perceived duty to maximize shareholder 
value was ripe for examination.”90 Edward Waitzer and Johnny Jaswal also commented that 
BCE gave the SCC “a rare opportunity to articulate and clarify its view with respect to proper 
corporate purpose and the responsibilities of directors.”91 In its decision, the SCC reiterated 
its holding in Peoples that directors were permitted to consider the interests of, among others, 
“shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”92 As well, 
the court held that directors were “not confined to short-term profit or share value,” but that 
when the corporation is of a going concern, directors were to look to the long-term interests of 
the company.93 The court also reinforced its support for the business judgment rule.
Most interestingly, the court held that directors were required to act in the best interests 
of the company “viewed as a good corporate citizen”94 and “commensurate with the corpora-
tion’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.”95 The court did not go further in their concept 
of corporate citizenry. Jeffrey Bone has pointed out that the court failed to create a test or legal 
framework on how to determine good corporate citizenry, and it is unclear whether this aspect 
of the decision was intentional, due perhaps to a reluctance to give the concept legal teeth.96 
The viability of good corporate citizenry as a legal concept remains to be seen. 
Scholars weighing in following the BCE decision tended to express frustration over the 
lack of clarity in the law. Waitzer and Jaswal felt that BCE “add[ed] to the confusion surround-
89 Readers are again invited to review the summaries and analyses available for greater details on the case. 
See e.g. Mohammad Fadel, “BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48 Can Bus 
LJ 190; Jeffrey Bone, “The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability: BCE Inc. in search of a 
legal construct known as the ‘Good Corporate Citizen,’” online: Alberta Law Review Online Supplement 
<http://www.albertalawreview.com/index.php/alr/supplement/view/BCE-in-search-of-good-corporate-
citizen>; J Anthony VanDuzer, “BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in 
its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples” (2009) 43 UBC L Rev 205; Sarah P Bradley, 
“BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance, 
and Good Corporate Citizenship?” (2010) 41 Ottawa L Rev 325. 
90 Moore & Ainley, supra note 83 at 5. 
91 Edward Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate ‘Citizen’” (2009) 47 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 439 at 442.
92 BCE, supra note 8 at para 39.
93 Ibid at para 38. Regarding the oppression remedy, the court found there was no violation by the directors 
in their fiduciary duties.
94 Ibid at para 66.
95 Ibid at para 82.
96 Bone, supra note 89.
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ing directors’ duties and the indeterminate nature and scope of their agency obligations.”97 
They noted that:
Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or are obliged 
to consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not addressed clearly 
by the Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in Peoples, ‘this Court found that 
although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be 
appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions 
on shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders.’ Later, the Court stated that ‘the 
duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty 
to treat individual stakeholders… equitably and fairly.’ Is this duty mandatory?98
In rendering its decision, the court seemed to reject the fiduciary duty to maximizing 
shareholder value in change of control transactions as applied by the Delaware court in Revlon. 
The SCC provided directors with considerable flexibility in considering the interests of other 
stakeholders in determining the best interests of the company. Nevertheless, the wording from 
the courts, both at trial and on appeal, was careful to sidestep any conflict between the US 
Revlon case and the Canadian cases Peoples and BCE. The trial judge in BCE found that “the 
ruling in Peoples is not necessarily incompatible with the application of the Revlon duty [in 
BCE],” but did not engage further on the matter and did not indicate that Revlon was even 
applicable to Canadian law.99 The SCC’s exploration of the topic was also limited to a brief 
discussion of Revlon that Moore and Ainley felt did not fully engage the issue, noting:
Rather than explore whether there are any special duties placed on directors in the 
context of a potential change of control, the Court, in a cursory fashion, considered 
the “Revlon line” from Delaware merely to address whether Revlon stands for the 
proposition that the interests of shareholders prevail over those creditors. However, 
even on this narrow question the Court neither rejected nor endorsed Delaware 
law.100
The SCC, instead, relied on the former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey to leave 
open the possibility that Peoples and Revlon were not necessarily in conflict: 
[It] is important to keep in mind the precise content of this ‘best interests’ concept—
that is, to whom this duty is owed and when. Naturally, one often thinks that direc-
tors owe this duty to both the corporation and the stockholders. That formulation 
is harmless in most instances because of the confluence of interests, in that what is 
good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good for the stockholders. There 
are times, of course, when the focus is directly on the interests of the stockholders. 
But, in general, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the 
stockholders.101
97 Waitzer & Jaswal, supra note 91 at 455.
98 Ibid at 461 [emphasis in original].
99 BCE Inc, Re, [2008] RJQ 1029, 43 BLR (4th) 39 at para 203.
100 Ibid.
101 BCE, supra note 8 at para 87, citing Norman E Veasey & Christine T Di Guglielmo, “What Happened in 
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments” 
(2005) 153 U Pa L Rev 1399 at 1431.
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In particular, the SCC found that the “the Revlon line of cases has not displaced the fun-
damental rule that the duty of the directors cannot be confined to particular priority rules, but 
is rather a function of business judgment of what is in the best interests of the corporation, in the 
particular situation it faces.”102 Then little more regarding Revlon was said by the court.
Mohammed Fadel noted that, in the wake of the decision, “the Canadian corporate law 
of directors’ duties has become beset by uncertainty, incoherence and confused rhetoric with 
respect to one of the most basic issues of corporate law: how to reconcile the competing inter-
ests of shareholder and non-shareholder corporate stakeholders.”103 Jeffrey MacIntosh expressed 
the view that, “only legislative intervention (in particular, declaring that directors duties’ are 
owed to shareholders alone) can adequately address the difficulties that [Peoples and BCE] have 
created.”104 Others pointed to the possible inclusion of non-shareholder stakeholder interests as 
a potential diminution in directorial accountability, as was similarly argued by critics of team 
production theory.105 Allowing directors to be accountable to many generally results in direc-
tors becoming accountable to no one.106
On the other hand, from a practical standpoint, Jeremy Fraiberg found that while direc-
tors did have a limited scope to forego maximizing shareholder value in change of control 
transactions under BCE, it was unlikely the scenario would ever occur.107 The formidable busi-
ness judgement rule applies, rendering the provision somewhat latent in practice. The need 
for balance between stakeholder interests and business judgment has meant that the inclusion 
of stakeholder interests in law has been unremarkable for those looking to reform the model 
through purely legal means. That may be why, on a theoretical level, almost all corporate gov-
ernance reformists have agreed that the inclusion of stakeholders in the governance model is 
necessary, and the issue seems to have reached a plateau in scholarly discussions.
BCE seems to have left a significant question for Canadian legal scholars and practitioners. 
The gray area may be frustrating. Many scholars said as much following Peoples,108 and Waitzer 
and Jaswal have identified legal gaps flowing from the decision in BCE (and alternative ways 
to achieve corporate citizenry through the law).109 In these circumstances, it may be helpful 
102 BCE, supra note 8 at para 87 [emphasis added].
103 Fadel, supra note 89 at 190.
104 Jeffrey G MacIntosh, “BCE and the Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quicksand” (2009) 48 
Can Bus LJ 255.
105 See e.g. VanDuzer, supra note 89.
106 This may in fact already be an issue needing to be tackled in governance reform, as director account-
ability has expanded in many ways: directors are accountable to courts, regulators under public interest 
powers, and accountability through statutory means. This increase in director accountability and liability 
requires there to be acute awareness of what decisions are properly made at the board-level and what 
directors should be held accountable for. See e.g. Paul Cantor, “Oversight and Insight: Building Blocks 
for Enhanced Board Effectiveness” (2012) 163 Director Journal 3. Allowing stakeholder interests to be 
properly considered in board decision-making enables a team production model to take hold (Margaret 
M Blair & Lynn A Stout, “Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board” 
(2001) 79 Wash ULQ 403). 
107 Jeremy D Fraiberg, “Fiduciary Outs and Maximizing Shareholder Value Following BCE” (2009) 48 Can 
Bus LJ 212.
108 See e.g. Mohamed F Khimji, “Peoples v. Wise – Conflating Directors’ Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholder 
Protection” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 209.
109 Waitzer & Jaswal, supra note 91 at 463-493.
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to consider Bone’s take on the matter. Bone has painted Peoples and BCE as creating a poten-
tial future duty for directors to recognize environmental issues in their corporate decision-
making.110 He notes that “modern Canadian corporations may be wise to stay ahead of the 
curve and begin their transformation into a new era of corporate ethics in relation to corporate 
citizenship.”111 Bone contends that it is possible to conceive of future litigation exploring this 
language and attempting to attribute legal significance to the “good corporate citizen” concept. 
The BCE decision may indeed “represent a new standard that gives directors the authority to 
make decisions based on non-financial principles, as opposed to simply economic values as the 
solitary feature.”112 Future litigation may provide a much needed tipping point in Canadian 
corporate governance standards.
Thus, while legal scholars and practitioners continue to exhibit their frustration over what 
Peoples and BCE mean relative to US case law and how the singular objective of shareholder 
wealth maximization is now confused, confusion should be expected in these circumstances. 
Canada is shifting away from the well-established laws and norms in the United States. The 
indications from the SCC suggest that Canada is poised to transform its corporate law to 
embrace a stakeholder approach to governance that may permit, and one day even require 
some form of CSR. Stakeholder interests are clearly permitted—perhaps even required—to 
be considered in directorial decision-making. Where the corporation is of a going concern, 
directors are to consider the long-term interests of the company. Sustainability is becoming 
the emerging business megatrend that is starting to “force fundamental and persistent shifts in 
how companies compete.”113 These external dynamic pressures interacting with the coordinat-
ing mechanism of Canadian common law suggests that the road to transformational corporate 
governance reform in Canada is already being paved.
4. ATTAINING TRANSFORMATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The current corporate landscape is particularly relevant in either diverting or strengthening 
Canada’s position on shareholder primacy, and a progression towards transformational cor-
porate governance has transpired for some time now. Douglas Branson has noted that the 
CSR movement is “converging with, rather than diverging from, broader trends in corpor-
ate governance.”114 The collaborative interplay between normative and legal constructs and 
the coordinative mechanism of regulation that continuously interacts with external pressures 
significantly contribute to the establishment of corporate laws that incorporate CSR funda-
mentals. The movement is now reforming and creating corporate legal structures that not only 
enable, but require, CSR concepts to be embodied within corporate governance practices. 
While the common law continues to balance the needs of shareholders versus other stake-
holders, innovative new corporate structures are forming on the sidelines that embed stake-
holder interests and CSR into their governance structures, along with more aggressive social 
mandates. The emergence of hybrid corporate models that bridge the gap between for-profit 
and non-profit legal characteristics signals the growing demand for social change. Canada is 
110 Jeffrey Bone, “Corporate Environmental Responsibility in the Wake of the Supreme Court Decision of 
BCE Inc. and Bell Canada” (2009) 27 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 5.
111 Bone, supra note 89 at para 47.
112 Ibid at para 45.
113 David A Lubin & Daniel C Etsy, “The Sustainability Imperative” (May 2010) Harv Bus Rev 42 at 44.
114 Douglas M Branson, “Corporate Social Responsibility Redux” (2002) 76 Tul L Rev 1207 at 1225.
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poised to become a leader of transformational corporate governance reform on two fronts: (1) 
through the reformation of its existing laws regulating mainstream corporate governance prac-
tices, and (2) in the creation of hybrid laws that can meet growing demands to legally house 
and govern social purpose businesses and enterprises. Below is a brief overview of how Canada 
may use the opportunities provided in the common law to attain transformational corporate 
governance reform in its existing for-profit corporations and in the development of hybrid 
corporate legal structures. 
4.1 For-Profit Corporations
Canadian legal scholars may disengage from the circular argument as to whether stakeholder 
interests and shareholder primacy can co-exist and whether stakeholders need to be recognized 
under the law. The Peoples and BCE decisions have made it clear that stakeholder interests are 
permissible considerations for any board to consider, not only with respect to how appeasing 
stakeholder interests may increase shareholder wealth, but also because considering those inter-
ests furthers the best interests of the corporation, when viewed as a good corporate citizen. The 
codification of stakeholder interests into the Canadian legal governance framework has created 
the possibility of reforming Canadian corporate governance practices with respect to for-profit 
companies. Broad-based change to the shareholder primacy norm is necessary, and Canada 
seems to be moving in that direction. 
From a soft law perspective, the Canadian government has actively endorsed practicing 
CSR, including publishing CSR policies on social and environmental sustainability. These 
policy guidelines provide an interesting look at CSR trends and how they may play an influ-
ential role in outlining Canada’s governance model. The federal government has encouraged 
the practice of CSR at home and abroad by endorsing the International Organization for 
Standardization’s 2010 report ISO 26000:2010 Guidance on Social Responsibility115 and by pub-
lishing its own report, Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the International 
Extractive Sector,116 which adopts international performance guidelines set by the International 
Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability 
(2006),117 the US State Department’s Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(2000),118 and the Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Framework (2011).119 
The Canadian government’s establishment of a Centre for Excellence in CSR provides a reposi-
tory of information on related policies and practices along with a forum to advance perti-
115 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000:2010 Guidance on Social Responsibility, 
(2006) online: International Organization for Standardization <http://www.iso.org/iso/
catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546>. 
116 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR 
Strategy for the International Extractive Sector (March 2009), online: Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ds/csr-strategy-
rse-stategie.aspx>.
117 International Financial Corporation, Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, 
(effective 12 January 2012), online: IFC <http://www.ifc.org>
118 US Department of State, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, (2000), online: US 
Department of State <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202526.pdf>.
119 Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Framework, (2011), online: Global Reporting 
Initiative <https://www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-framework-overview/Pages/default.aspx>.
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nent CSR issues.120 Together with Canadian common law, these guidelines create an effective 
outline for a Canadian transformational governance model.
Janis Sarra has noted that norms for effective corporate governance are underdeveloped 
in Canada.121 As our global consciousness becomes increasingly aware of the environmental 
crisis at hand, the expectation that corporations will incorporate their own externalities into 
their business models does not seem unreasonable. BCE has left the law highly uncertain in 
a range of scenarios,122 and this may work to favour broader community and environmental 
interests. Other reform efforts are worth noting. Significant improvements to curtail negative 
corporate externalities have been made within the CSR movement, although the strengths and 
motivations differ amongst its proponents. Green indices, socially responsible investing, and 
other innovations from the social sector have attempted to recalibrate markets to account for 
hidden costs associated with the shareholder primacy model.123 These efforts do not change the 
structure of the corporation per se, but go a long way towards (1) lessening the negative conse-
quences attributed from the shareholder wealth maximization norm inherent in the corporate 
model and (2) contributing to the external pressures that lend themselves to the coordinative 
mechanism in which our laws take part. In an era when CSR has never been more relevant, 
Canadian for-profit corporations may now begin to deviate from the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm that accompanies the shareholder primacy model under the direction and 
encouragement of Canadian common law. 
4.2 Hybrid Models
Hybridity is a new innovation in corporate law that has received little attention in academic 
scholarship. In the corporate context, a hybrid can be defined as a corporate legal structure 
that blends traditional for-profit and non-profit legal characteristics to enable the dual pursuit 
of economic and social interests.124 The emergence and development of hybrid models on the 
global stage signifies a new wave in the CSR movement. These models are designed to integrate 
stakeholder interests and sustainable practices into their business models far beyond the capa-
bilities of the traditional for-profit legal structure.
The role of corporate hybrids in Canada’s path to transformational corporate governance 
is important but relatively unexplored terrain. Against the backdrop of an ongoing environ-
mental crisis and an escalating demand for greater sustainability, there is a growing impera-
tive to reap the benefits of sustainable governance from the private sector. The private sector 
requires quality legal tools to help grow and foster sustainable development and the emergence 
of hybrid corporate models should be seen as a critical component of attaining transforma-
tional corporate governance reform in Canada. While reforming the mainstream for-profit 
120 “Centre for Excellence in Corporate Social Responsibility at the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy 
and Petroleum”, online: CIM <http://web.cim.org/csr/>.
121 Janis Sarra, “Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Canadian and International 
Developments” (2002) 76 Tul L Rev 1691 at 1706.
122 Waitzer & Jaswal, supra note 91 at 462.
123 See e.g. “Ethical Funds”, online: Ethical Funds <http://www.ethicalfunds.com> and the work of the 
Social Investment Organization, its members, and affiliates (“Social Investment Organization”, online: 
SIO <http://www.socialinvestment.ca/>).
124 Also known as a “blended enterprise” (Brakman Reiser, supra note 11).
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corporation is imperative, and these efforts must continue, this reform should take place in 
combination with creating opportunities for social enterprises that are unable to reach their 
full potential under existing legal constructs. 
Specifically, three actions are necessary to promote the use of hybrids in Canada: (1) con-
tinued growth for existing hybrids; (2) support for emerging hybrids that enable traditional 
non-profit and charitable organizations to use the market as an engine to disseminate prod-
ucts and services; and (3) the creation of new hybrids that link corporate economic interests 
with social output and will appeal to the relevant players in the for-profit sector. In addition, 
Canadian legislators need to be careful not to adopt American solutions to Canadian issues, 
and inadvertently disrupt Canada’s own progressive common law developments. This point is 
elaborated upon using the state-level US benefit corporations as an example. 
4.2.1 suPPort exIstIng hyBrIDs: the co-oPeratIve
The co-operative ownership model is a persuasive existing alternative structure that can support 
a vast number of social business ideas. As one of the oldest corporate structures in the world, 
the co-operative is a hybrid structure since it allows members to pursue both social and eco-
nomic mandates. The International Cooperative Alliance (“ICA”) defines the co-operative as 
“an autonomous association of people united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social and cultural needs through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.”125 
Internationally, the United Nations has “recognized and reaffirmed the role of co-opera-
tives in economic, social, and cultural development and in the achievement of social policy 
objectives.”126 Nevertheless, while for-profit, non-profit, and charitable organizations are com-
monly known and generally contemplated by social entrepreneurs, it seems that, beyond those 
in the agricultural and housing sectors, many entrepreneurs have been reluctant to adopt the 
co-operative form. Entrepreneurs may cite a lack of control, complicated decision-making 
process, or limited availability of additional capital as significant reasons why the co-operative 
model is not an ideal form for their business.127 Equally so, mainstream corporate legal scholar-
ship has paid comparatively little attention to co-operative ownership. Despite ICA’s findings 
that co-operatives “provide over 100 million jobs around the world, 20% more than multi-
national enterprises,”128 the co-operative structure is not pervasive in Canada, where there are 
125 “Co-operative identity, values & principles”, online: International Co-operative Alliance <http://ica.
coop/en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles>.
126 “International Day of Co-operatives”, online: United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Division for Social Policy and Development, Social Perspective on Development Branch <http://
social.un.org/index/Cooperatives/InternationalDayofCooperatives.aspx> (the UN General Assembly 
declared 2012 to be the “International Year of Co-operatives” in order to highlight the importance of 
co-operatives to economic development and social innovation around the world).
127 See e.g. Amanda Wilson, “Financing the Co-operative Movement: For Better or For Worse?” The 
Dominion (5 April 2010), online: The Dominion <http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/3270>.
128 “Co-operatives Around the World”, online: National Co-operative Business Association <http://usa2012.
coop/about-co-ops/cooperatives-around-world>.
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around 9,000 co-operatives, compared to over 2.4 million for-profit corporations, approxi-
mately 85,000 charitable organizations, and 65,000 non-profit organizations.129
The important governing feature of co-operative ownership is that the role of owner and 
stakeholder are closely connected. A member is an individual who both owns the co-operative 
and acts as a user of the co-operative in some way. In contrast, a shareholder of an investor-
owned corporation owns the business by owning shares in the business, but the shareholder 
might never be a user of the business. Co-operatives, then, may be regarded as “associations of 
people” whereas standard for-profit corporations are “associations of capital.”130 Joint owner-
ship of a co-operative means that all members of a co-operative are equal decision makers, as 
co-operatives employ a democratic system of one-member, one-vote. All members share in 
the benefits of the co-operative, based on how much they use its services. By pooling their 
resources and working together, members can satisfy a common need through the co-opera-
tive. The Canadian Co-operative Association notes that, “since a co-operative is both a busi-
ness and an association of people, the co-operative’s success will depend on how well these 
foundations are built within the enterprise.”131
The ICA has outlined the principles of co-operative ownership as follows: (1) voluntary 
and open membership; (2) democratic member control; (3) member economic participa-
tion; (4) autonomy and independence; (5) education, training, and information; (6) coopera-
tion among co-operatives; and (7) concern for community. 132 These co-operative principles 
re present written verification of the morals and values suggested by progressive supporters 
of stakeholder theory. The preamble of the Canadian Cooperatives Act itself states how co-
operatives “work for the social and economic development of their communities through poli-
cies approved by their members,” and s. 7 of the Act embodies many of the ICA co-operative 
principles.133 The co-operative movement is a living example of stakeholder theory intertwined 
with social values, and significantly pre-dates the arrival of stakeholder theory to mainstream 
corporate legal scholarship and practice. 
As corporate reformers desperately seek answers to the big sustainability question hanging 
over shareholder primacy, why is there such a great disconnect between them and advocates 
of the co-operative form, who claim to hold the answers? The ICA has directly addressed the 
missing link between the design of co-operatives and its widespread success. Despite the co-
operative structure’s long history, the ICA contends that the model is being utilized well below 
its potential. The organization believes that “with appropriate support and greater understand-
129 “Key Small Business Statistics July 2012”, online: Industry Canada, Small Business and Tourism 
Branch <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/eng/h_02689.html>; “About Co-ops in Canada”, 
online: Government of Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada <http://www5.agr.gc.ca/
eng/?id=1232131333489>.
130 “The Co-op Advantage”, online: British Columbia Co-operative Association <http://www.bcca.coop/
content/advantage>.
131 “How to start a co-op”, online: Canadian Co-operative Association <http://www.coopscanada.coop/en/
coopdev/StartCoop>.
132 “Statement on the Co-operative Identity”, online: International Co-operative Alliance <http://ica.coop/
en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles>.
133 Canada Cooperatives Act, RSC 1998, c 1.
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ing and recognition, [co-operatives] could contribute much more.”134 In early 2013, the ICA 
published a manifesto entitled Blueprint for a Co-operative Decade (the “Blueprint”) with the 
ambitious target of 2020 as the year when the co-operative form of business “is an acknowl-
edged leader in economic, social and environmental sustainability, the model preferred by 
people, and the fastest growing form of enterprise.”135 The ICA aims to elevate member par-
ticipation and governance while positioning co-operatives as “builders of sustainability.”136 It 
pinpoints a lack of clarity as to how co-operatives are defined and distinguished as a main 
stumbling block in the co-operative movement and cites a particular need to “establish an 
‘irreducible core’ of what it means to be a co-operative.”137 The Blueprint outlines a multi-
faceted plan to secure the co-operative identity and increase its awareness, such as through 
co-operative education,138 the engagement of young people,139 and utilizing social media,140 
among other mechanisms. The Blueprint also hones in on “ensur[ing] there are supportive legal 
frameworks for co-operative growth” as a particular area in need of improvement.141 High-level 
indicative actions proposed by the ICA that may benefit Canada include developing guidelines 
on how to apply the ICA co-operative principles and providing assistance to Canadian national 
parliamentarians, legislators, and policy-makers through a comparative study on the ways laws 
apply to co-operatives in different jurisdictions, among other things.142 Possible improvements 
may stem from co-operative treatment under tax laws, competition and anti-trust laws, and 
other regulations.143 
The co-operative ownership model has been given new impetus from the United Nations’ 
support and the ICA’s aggressive plans for growth. The fusion of owner and user roles in co-
operative ownership enforces an unassailable stakeholder-based style of governance that cannot 
be replicated in for-profit companies. Furthermore, research indicates that the survival rate of 
134 International Co-operative Alliance, Blueprint for a Co-operative Decade (January 2013), online: ICA 
<http://ica.coop> at 3 [Blueprint].
135 Ibid at 39.
136 Ibid at 15.
137 Ibid at 30. 
138 Ibid at 42. 
139 Ibid at 11, 12, 23.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid at 6.
142 Ibid at 30.
143 Ibid at 29.
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co-operatives is significantly higher than that of traditional businesses.144 From a governance 
perspective (rather than simply a marketing perspective), the co-operative is far superior in 
providing adequate infrastructure to support stakeholder-based management as heralded by 
advocates of stakeholder theory and likely contributes to this higher survival rate. As interna-
tional advocates mobilize in hopes of generating significant momentum behind the co-opera-
tive movement, much more may be seen from this model in Canada and its contributions to 
sustainability in the years to come.
4.2.2 suPPort emergIng hyBrIDs: the Bc communIty contrIButIon comPany
Transformational corporate governance is not isolated to the for-profit sector. Unlocking the 
market potential from the non-profit sector is another way to combat the negative effects of 
shareholder primacy, infuse social value within communities, and foster greater sustainable 
development. Dan Pallotta has argued that society’s “economic apartheid” of for-profit and 
non-profit sectors “undermines our ability to eradicate great problems and, ironically, puts 
charity at a severe disadvantage to the for-profit sector at every level.”145 Canada should explore 
the implementation of a hybrid specifically targeted to address this untapped non-profit sector 
resource, and indeed, two provinces—British Columbia and Nova Scotia—have already begun 
to do so. Canada also has the added benefit of observing how hybrid models have fared in the 
United Kingdom. 
The community interest company (“CIC”) was the very first of the new generation of 
hybrids implemented in the United Kingdom in 2005. CICs are established to trade goods or 
services for the community interest.146 The particular novelty of CICs is that they are able to do 
what charitable and non-profit organizations cannot, which is raise equity capital in exchange 
for shares. As noted earlier, in March 2012, the BC government announced the creation of its 
hybrid, the community contribution company” (“C3”), which is modeled after the UK CIC. 
144 Johnston Birchall & Lou Hammond Ketilson, Resilience of the Cooperative Business Model in Times of 
Crisis (19 June 2009), online: International Labour Organization <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_108416.pdf>. According to Co-operatives 
UK, between 2008 and 2011, while the UK economy as a whole shrank by 1.7 percent, the co-oper-
ative economy grew by 19.6 percent. In the same period, the number of co-operatives increased from 
4,820 to 5,933 (Stephen Gardner, “Alternative Ownership Structures – Stronger Together” (5 February 
2013), online: Ethical Corporation <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/business-strategy/alternative-owner-
ship-structures-%E2%80%93-stronger-together>). See also “Co-op facts and figures”, online: Canadian 
Co-operative Association <http://www.coopscanada.coop/en/about_co-operative/Co-op-Facts-and-
Figures> (a 2008 Quebec study found that 62 percent of new co-operatives were still operating after five 
years, compared with 35 percent for other new businesses; after 10 years, the figures were 44 percent and 
20 percent respectively). 
145 Dan Pallotta, Uncharitable: How Restraints on Non-Profits Undermines Our Potential (London: Tufts 
University Press, 2010) at 9.
146 UK Companies Act, supra note 6.
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This hybrid was made available to the public on July 29, 2013.147 Nova Scotia has since fol-
lowed suit, announcing the adoption of a similar hybrid in November 2012.148 
Like the UK CIC, the C3 is designed to enable and encourage the investment of private 
wealth into community projects. The most noteworthy features of the C3 include an asset lock 
and dividend cap. The asset lock feature restricts assets from being sold for less than their fair 
market value except in the pursuit of the social benefits the entity is designed to pursue or in a 
transfer to a non-profit organization, or another C3.149 Dividends on C3 shares are capped to 
ensure that profits are either retained by the entity or used for a community benefit purpose.150 
The hybrid is taxed as a regular corporation. 
Stakeholder interests are prominent in both CIC and C3 hybrids. Each hybrid has annual 
reporting requirements where the company is expected to account for how it has benefited 
the community and engaged stakeholders,151 with the notable difference being that the CIC 
reports to a regulator who has a continuing monitoring and enforcement role over CICs.152 
There is no equivalent regulator in British Columbia, and the C3 is only required to publish 
its report in the same manner that companies are required to publish financial statements and 
auditor’s reports under the Business Corporations Act.153 In the United Kindgom, the stated 
community purpose becomes a primary focus for CIC directors, and CICs are recommended 
to form stakeholder advisory groups for the CIC’s benefit.154 Each CIC crafts its own individu-
alized stakeholder process and is required to describe its stakeholder efforts in an annual report 
which the UK CIC Regulator reviews. 
There is thus a question as to whether the lack of a regulator in BC to monitor C3 com-
pliance will be problematic. The CIC Regulator has played a dedicated and important role 
in administering and maintaining CICs in the United Kingdom; this role is enabled by its 
power to investigate complaints, act if the CIC is found to be violating its community purpose 
or asset lock provisions, change the makeup of the board, or even terminate the CIC when 
necessary.155 It remains to be seen how successful the BC and Nova Scotia versions will be in 
comparison to the UK CIC, and how each province’s social sector will adapt despite having 
less regulatory infrastructure and governmental oversight, and no direct official to contact. In 
comparison, the CIC Regulator’s office had three full-time and four part-time staff members 
147 British Columbia Ministry of Finance, “Legislative Changes Encourage Investment in Social Capital” 
(2 March 2013), online: British Columbia Newsroom <http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2013/03/leg-
islative-changes-encourage-investment-in-social-capital.html>; “Community Contribution Companies 
are coming... BC Ministry of Finance initiative”, online: BC Centre for Social Enterprise <http://www.
centreforsocialenterprise.com/C3_BC.html> [BC Centre for Social Enterprise].
148 Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations, supra note 5.
149 Bill 23, Finance Statutes Amendment Act, 4th Sess, 39th Parl, British Columbia, 2012 at ss 51.931, 51.95 
[C3 Bill].
150 Ibid at s 51.94 (unlike the UK CIC, interests on bonds are not capped in the C3).
151 UK Companies Act, supra note 6 at s 34. 
152 “Community Interest Companies”, online: Department for Business, Innovation & Skills <http://www.
bis.gov.uk/cicregulator>.
153 SBC 2002 c 57 at ss 1, 198-200; C3 Bill, supra note 149 at s 51.96. 
154 UK Companies Act, supra note 6.
155 Ibid.
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in 2012, and the CIC Regulator reported receiving over 7,000 emails and 3,000 phone calls 
to their office that year.156 C3s will not have this support; administering and governing C3s 
will be entirely through self-regulation. On the other hand, some of the regulatory void could 
be filled by other sources. For example, in anticipation of the C3, the BC Centre for Social 
Enterprise provided a small number of free workshops to educate interested parties on the 
details of the C3 model.157 Other non-profit organizations may also step up to fill this void.
The C3 may be attractive for those in the non-profit sector in need of raising capital—
which may indeed be a significant number.158 The C3 allows those in the non-profit sector to 
capitalize on the market to disseminate social goods and services while ensuring social man-
dates remain intact. The legal characteristics of the CIC, in contrast, may appear to be too lim-
iting for many of those currently situated in the for-profit sector. The asset lock and dividend 
cap features disrupt the market for corporate control, and entrepreneurs who envision broader 
market dissemination by way of acquisition by larger corporations are unlikely to seek out this 
model. However, since the C3 structure allows capital to be raised through the issuance of 
shares, it creates economic opportunities that have traditionally been closed off to charitable 
and non-profit organizations. Moreover, a C3 structure may be more attractive to individu-
als or groups seeking to start community projects or programs but who have little interest in 
relationships based on membership (such as those found in the co-operative). 
Research on the CIC model is limited. Dana Brakman Reiser has noted that the CIC 
“assumes [there is] a pool of investors with an appetite for wedding financial and social return 
and sufficient brand awareness and confidence to appeal to them…. [It also] however, requires 
these investors to be especially devoted to the blended enterprise concept by substantially limit-
ing the upside of their investments.”159 The growth of impact investing suggests there are social 
investors out there who can balance these economic and social interests in order to sustain the 
C3 model in Canada but one can only assume. In the United Kingdom, the number of CICs 
has doubled in the last two years. There are now over 6,000 CICs, with around 2,000 created 
in the last year alone.160 Over 100 new CICs are registered every month,161 and a considerable 
number of CICs have lasted past the three-year mark. If it is simply a numbers game, do 6,000 
CICs spell success after eight years in existence? Compared to the number of UK co-opera-
tives, the answer seems to be yes. Sources indicate that in the United Kingdom there are over 
5,933 independent co-operatives comprising approximately 13.5 million members, with the 
156 Regulator of Community Interest Companies, “Annual Report 2011/2012”, online: Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills <http://www.bis.gov.uk> at 13.
157 BC Centre for Social Enterprise, supra note 147.
158 Josh Wingrove, “Marc and Craig Kielburger’s do-gooding social enterprise” The Globe and Mail (19 
March 2010), online: The Globe and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com/ news/national/marc-and-craig-
kielburgers-do-gooding-social-enterprise/article1506256/page2/> (Paul Martin, Canada’s former Prime 
Minister, commented, “Government policy hasn’t caught up…I think Canada is ready for it. I think 
Canada is looking for it”).
159 Brakman Reiser, “Governing”, supra note 11 at 649.
160 Regulator of Community Interest Companies, supra note 156 at 13 (590 CICs were also dissolved, with 
key reasons for dissolution being “lack of funding, no trading activity, and poor corporate governance”).
161 CIC Association, “What is a CIC?” online: CIC Association <http://www.cicassociation.org.uk/about/
what-is-a-cic>. 
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co-operative economy at £35.6 billion.162 There are no equivalent statistics available on CICs’ 
monetary contributions to the British economy or on the number of members. Nevertheless, 
based solely on the number of active CICs versus co-operatives, the CIC numbers are certainly 
impressive. 
It is important to note, however, that the UK CIC movement had considerable marketing 
and promotion behind its initial rollout, as well as providing social entrepreneurs with access to 
social finance limited solely to CICs.163 The BC government’s failure to regulate, educate, and 
promote the C3 is a disappointing start for the hybrid, and there are legitimate fears that many 
entrepreneurs will not elect to adopt the model as a result—leading to a potentially erroneous 
assumption that hybrids are ineffective tools for eliciting social change. The several-year lead 
from CICs should be seen as a learning opportunity for Canadian legislators and regulators 
to gain from the United Kingdom’s experience, but there is little to gain if lessons are not put 
to use. Adequate support and extensive follow-up research will be a necessary step to ensure 
the proper development of this Canadian hybrid in the future, and other provinces would be 
well-advised to carefully monitor how the BC and Nova Scotia models fare and build upon 
their experiences.
4.2.3 enact meanIngful neW hyBrIDs
Canada can and should be an influential player in the development of hybrids, particularly 
those that will provide a realistic option for social enterprises that operate in the for-profit 
sector. Ideas regarding how to accomplish this objective are developing, and should continue 
to be explored.164 
Several US innovations, such as the American B Corporation branding and state benefit 
corporations, display promise. Self-imposed and privately regulated, the B Corporation cer-
tification system is run by B Lab, a Philadelphia-based non-profit organization that evaluates 
companies on social, environmental and workplace criteria. B Lab is attempting to establish 
a new kind of company, one that “harnesses the power of business to solve social and envi-
ronmental problems.”165 At the time of this article, there were over 660 registered American 
B Corporations, and B Lab is actively marketing its branding internationally, including in 
Canada. There are in total 70 Canadian B Corporations to date.166 
In order to become a B Corporation, a company is first required to take a B Impact 
Assessment, which asks the company to respond to socially minded questions relating to 
accountability, employees, consumers, community and the environment.167 B Lab’s gover-
162 “About Co-operatives”, online: Co-operatives UK <http://www.uk.coop/co-operatives>.
163 See e.g. “Community Interest Companies Association”, online: CIC Association <http://www.cicassocia-
tion.org.uk/>. Thank you to Stacey Corriveau for this point.
164 See e.g. Jason Dudek & Alex Zieba, “The Deliberate Corporation: Moving Beyond Social Business” 
online: Deliberate Economics <http://deliberateeconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-
Deliberate-Corporation-by-Deliberate-Economics-May-2012.pdf>.
165 “B Corporation”, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net>.
166 Ibid. 
167 “Performance Requirements”, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements>. 
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nance-related questions strongly imply support for greater stakeholder-based and board-con-
trolled management. A corporation is certified once an acceptable score is obtained under 
B Lab’s Rating System, and the company is required to submit supporting documents for a 
portion of the answers.168 B Lab relies on this certification and a separate auditing system to 
ensure B Corporations are pursuing and achieving their social mandates. Given that B Lab 
is a private organization, it does not have the authority to manipulate existing legal struc-
tures. Nevertheless, the B Impact Assessment goes to the core of the business purpose and 
mission, and addresses both stakeholder and sustainability concerns. Corporations may choose 
to become B Corporations so they can align themselves with like-minded companies, and the 
B Corporation branding may “draw in directors committed to a blended mission and investors 
willing to enforce it.”169 This certification could foreseeably become popularly recognizable to 
consumers in the future. Within an allotted time following certification, B Corporations are 
required to amend their articles of incorporation to permit directors to consider more than just 
shareholder interests when carrying out their duties—an exercise that for Canadian corpora-
tions seems benign and redundant when compared to existing Canadian common law.170 
Admittedly, B Corporations are loosely regulated, if at all. B Lab is a small organization 
that is not equipped to regulate numerous companies effectively, particularly given its addi-
tional involvement in legislative policymaking and sharp focus on marketing its brand. B Lab’s 
motivation has tended to lean towards attracting mass participation, not ensuring proper regu-
lation. B Lab’s standards are considerably weaker in comparison to other CSR certifications 
that are available on the market.171 It thus becomes a question of balance. There is some value to 
be had in generating a buzz and creating the impression of momentum, but the trade-off with 
mass inclusion is usually a lowering of standards. There may be a backlash from genuine ‘good’ 
companies that are reluctant to sign on due to low standards; one executive commented that 
joining the B Corporation movement would be like “sprinkling holy water on the process,” as 
standards they have set for themselves and expect from their competitors are markedly higher 
than B Lab’s offerings.172 So the question is, is B Corporation a mass movement for change, or 
does it simply allow companies to market themselves better—and if so, is this sufficient? There 
is certainly value in garnering collective strength from numbers, and legitimized advertising. 
Perhaps the value of aligning businesses with common interests through the B Corporation 
branding outweighs the need for high quality standards and adequate regulation. While B 
Lab’s focus has understandably been on establishing the B Corporation name, B Lab will have 
to be careful that its ongoing effort to gain mass participation does not dilute its branding to 
the point where it carries little meaning.
168 “Become a B Corporation”, online: B Corporation <http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/
how-to-become-a-b-corp>.
169 Brakman Reiser, “Governing”, supra note 11 at 643. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Some examples include the Global Initiative for Sustainable Ratings (GIRS), and standards provided by 
the Sustainable Accounting Standard Board and International Integrated Reporting Council. 
172 Comments made in a private interview by executives at Innate, an active gear company committed to 
clean design (“Innate Gear”, online: Innate Gear <http://www.innate-gear.com>).
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B Lab has also been pursuing the creation of benefit corporations in US state laws; 20 
states to date have adopted this new structure.173 There are interesting governing features in 
benefit corporations, which generally vary from state-to-state. Nonetheless, almost all state 
laws require that benefit corporations have a public benefit purpose and an annual benefit 
report. Furthermore, the significant value of the benefit corporation is identical to that of 
the B Corporation in that the companies must allow and, in some states, require directors to 
consider stakeholder interests such as those of employees, customers, the community, and the 
environment—again, similar to findings of the SCC in the Peoples and BCE decisions. MaRS 
Discovery District, a Canadian hub in social innovation, has partnered with B Corporation 
and has drafted a white paper pushing legislators to create an equivalent to the benefit corpora-
tion in Canada.174 
Certain aspects of the MaRS White Paper may be problematic with respect to the adoption 
of benefit corporations in Canada. There are several reasons for this: (1) Canada’s corporate 
laws are more progressive and are continuing to develop; (2) the main feature of the benefit 
corporation mirrors Canada’s progressive laws, and its implementation may potentially confuse 
the normative understanding of these laws; (3) without this feature, the benefit corporation’s 
offerings to Canadian law are minimal; (4) the benefit corporation has not had exponential 
success in the United States to date, so there is good reason for Canada to wait and see how it 
fares. 
US case law has made it clear that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder value in 
takeover situations, and the creation of the state benefit corporation is a direct response to that 
case law. The American hybrid is designed to address American corporate governance needs for 
social progress. But a Canadian way of governance is important and should be regarded as dis-
tinct. The MaRS White Paper recognizes that a failure to educate the Canadian public on exist-
ing common law may have created the need for a benefit corporation in Canada. This failure is 
not sufficiently persuasive to merit creating a new kind of corporate entity with similar govern-
ing features to those detailed in Canada’s developing corporate laws. More importantly, such 
a cross-border adoption might hinder the very development of more sustainable Canadian 
corporate laws and norms. Currently, the Canadian legal framework creates space for the pos-
sibility of all Canadian corporations to have a greater responsibility to consider environmental 
interests and to have sustainability baked into their corporate DNA. The common law may 
be at the cusp of this development, and the adoption of American-style innovations will not 
push this forward. 
To be clear, B Corporations are a positive development in the American context. They may 
also make sense for Canadian companies that are eager to market themselves as social enter-
prises while the common law is in flux and provincial governments mull the possible expansion 
of hybrid models. Through its impact assessment process, the B Corporation certification itself 
accomplishes a great deal that other legal structures cannot. Nevertheless, one cannot help but 
wish a Canadian certification process would originate that could allow for a unique Canadian 
voice to take shape in this movement. While Canadian companies interested in becoming 
B Corporations may elect to amend their governing documents to ensure non-shareholder 
173 “State by State Status”, online: Benefit Corp Information Center <http://www.benefitcorp.net/
state-by-state-legislative-status>. 
174 MaRS White Paper, supra note 7. 
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stakeholder interests are enshrined in their mandate, it is unclear what kind of fact scenario 
would require additional language in company documents to cause different end-results from 
what is already protected under Canadian common law. Canadian directors employing CSR 
principles in their governance are well protected on several fronts in the law, and it is not 
unreasonable to predict greater specificity in the future to some extent. 
Now is the time for paradigm-busting, well-researched, and well-thought out models to 
come into being. Legislators need to work quickly, but they should also be smart. There is a 
latecomer advantage175 to be had, where one can learn from the frontrunners of this move-
ment. Further research on corporate hybridity will be crucial for optimal results in imple-
mentation, as well as ongoing support from leaders in both for-profit and non-profit sectors 
working in the realm of social enterprises. 
5. CONCLUSION
The path to transformational corporate governance in Canada may be a challenging one. Thus, 
while the proper structuring of laws is critical to reform efforts, it is important to also con-
sider the need for normative cohesion. While the shareholder primacy model may appear 
to be entrenched in the United States, reforms are occurring nonetheless both in corporate 
legislation and within the social sector. A growing movement is attempting to reclassify the 
shareholder primacy model, allowing businesses to pursue both economic and social mandates 
in their corporate decision-making. In light of Canadian corporate culture, the trajectory of 
Canadian common law, and the current Canadian corporate governance landscape with regard 
to the rise of CSR and sustainability, Canada is poised to become a leader of transformational 
corporate governance in the foreseeable future. 
This article has outlined the high-level beginnings of the path Canada may take to foster 
sustainable development through for-profit and hybrid corporate models. Further develop-
ment of effective corporate governance norms is necessary in Canada. Canadian corporate legal 
scholarship must not become stagnant in relation to practical reform efforts. The opportuni-
ties to redesign the corporate legal model are there, whether at a grassroots level or through 
legislative reforms in reaction to the market. The hybrid phenomenon is quickly becoming the 
new wave of corporate reform to which Canada should turn its focus. In light of the apparent 
lack of a cohesive theory within the counter-hegemonic discourses on corporate law, and the 
potentially divergent language between corporate scholarship and practice, a stream of intel-
ligent and thoughtful Canadian commentary on the structural problems of the shareholder 
primacy model will be essential to the advancement of transformational Canadian corporate 
law and governance in the future. 
175 Thorstein Veblen, “Economic Theory in a Calculable Future” (1925) 15:1 The American Economic 
Review 48.

